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Abstract  
Research has proved that structural factors influence how frequently certain issues are 
mentioned in media. However there has been no research on how structural factors influence 
a certain media picture, such as that of Russia’s military capacity. Based on that Russia is the 
Nordics’ significant other the aim of this thesis was to investigate the extent to which Russia’s 
military capacity was perceived as a threat in the Nordic countries, as portrayed by media. 
The aim was further to test what structural factors impacted this media picture.   
To achieve this aim a time-serious cross-sectional dataset was gathered. In addition to 
structural factors predicted to influence international relations this dataset included a measure 
of the media perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat. This threat measure was 
based on a content analysis of articles published in Nordic newspapers 2004-2012. 
Russia’s military capacity was pictured as mostly a small but to some extent clear threat in 
Nordic newspapers. Further statistical analyses showed that Denmark is the outlier with the 
lowest level of perceived threat. Sweden has the highest average threat perception followed 
by Finland. Norway ended up in between. This was in line with the conclusion regarding the 
structural factors which showed that, on average, the stronger the historical memory of Russia 
as an enemy, the more threatful is the media picture of Russia’s military capacity. The result 
further indicated that, on average, the higher the trade with Russia is, the less threatful the 
media picture of Russia’s military capacity is.  
 
Keywords: The Nordic countries, Russia’s military capacity, threat perceptions, media 
picture, structural determinants.  
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1 Introduction 
Through the centuries Russia has been both a friend and a threat to the Nordic countries. 
Russia constitutes the Nordics’ significant other and its military capacity has in this role had a 
significant impact on the Nordic countries security policies (Rodin 2010, 121-126). This is 
illustrated by the intensive media debate that emerged earlier this year when the Supreme 
Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces said in an interview that the military would only be 
able to defend the country for one week, in the face of a limited assault and if being warned 
beforehand. After that help from NATO would be needed (Holmström 2012). Russia was 
quick to show that it indeed was a threat, at least concerning musical heritage, through 
broadcasting a remake of ABBA:s “Mamma Mia”, suggesting that Sweden should either stick 
canons to SAAB cars or seek protection by Russia. The situation further shows how 
information about international relations is nowadays primarily mediated to people through 
the media (Fransson Sayuli, Elander and Lidskog 2011, 99; Johnsonn-Cartee 2005, 4).  
Russia is quite busy with sticking canons to cars since it has more than doubled its military 
expenditure since 2004
1
 (SIPRI Milex 2013) and is predicted to increase it with a further 50-
100 percent the upcoming ten years (Vendil Pallin 2011, 163). This is a part of Russia’s 
ongoing military reform which, with mixed success (Nichol 2011, 4-7), aims at turning the 
armed forces into a modern high-tech professional army. However even though Russia’s 
military expenditure is the world’s third largest it is only roughly a third of what it was in the 
end of the Soviet Union (SIPRI Milex 2013).  
While increasing its military power Russia is also developing in an authoritarian direction as 
for example evidenced by its deteriorating Freedom House score. As a part of this 
development the use of anti-Western rhetoric is increasing (Hyodo and Vendil Pallin 2013). 
Meanwhile the West is due to financial problems scaling down its armed forces (Sipri 2013). 
These developments have led some intellectuals to talk about an emerging “New Cold-War” 
between Russia and the West (Lucas 2008, 18, 27, 269-270; Johansson 2008). 
Rising tensions is of relevance for the Nordic countries since a map presented last year by the 
head of Russia’s general staff showed that a significant part of the Nordics are within Russia’s 
“sphere of responsibility”2 (Storsjö 2013) which indicates that the Nordics’ near abroad for 
                                                          
1
 In constant US dollars (2011). As share of Russia’s GDP the increase of military expenditure is from 3,8 to 4,4 
percent. (Sipri 2013) 
2
 Makarov’s map can be found in appendix A. 
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Russia is of increased geopolitical importance. The Baltic Sea is for example one of Russia’s 
major export routes for gas and oil (Rodin 2010, 131) while the Baltic States have significant 
Russian speaking minorities. Both the 2008 Georgian war and Russia’s strategy show that 
Russia will intervene if these minorities are perceived to be mistreated (Presidential decree 
2009, §1 and §38).  
Concerning the Nordic countries near abroad in the north, the conflicting territorial claims in 
the Arctic
3
 are getting increased attention as a result of the new economic possibilities the ice 
melting is opening up to (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 121; Granholm 2011, 
263-265). The Arctic is for example predicted to contain 30 percent of the undiscovered 
natural gas in the world, which equals Russia’s known reserves (Cohen, Szaszdi and Dolbow 
2008). Russia therefore plans to increase its military presence in the area (Wezeman 2012, 8).  
In sum, Russia is judged to be the only state in the Nordic countries near abroad that within a 
foreseeable future can cause security problems (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 
120). Partly due to this the Nordic countries have in recent years deepened their defense 
cooperation and agreed upon the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity
4
. In light of these 
developments it is of increasing importance to understand how Russia’s military capacity is 
perceived in the Nordic countries and what the systematic determinants behind this perception 
are. 
2 Aim and research questions 
This thesis aims to investigate to what extent Russia’s military capacity5 is perceived as a 
threat in the Nordic countries
6
, as portrayed by the major Nordic media outlets between 2004 
and 2012, and what the determinants of this media picture are. The focus is on the media 
picture since it is the main source of information for people in general and especially 
concerning international relations where people have limited personal experience (Fransson 
Sayuli, Elander and Lidskog 2011, 99). The newspaper readership in the Nordic countries is 
one of the highest in the world. Thus, the number of people claiming to read at least one 
newspaper a day ranges from about  80 per cent in Finland (Statistics Finland 2011), followed 
by 75 per cent in Sweden (Nord and Strömbäck 2012, 10) and 67 percent in Denmark, to 63 
                                                          
3
 Map illustrating the overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic is found in appendix B. 
4
 The Nordic declaration on solidarity 2011 can be found in appendix C.  
5
 The notions of “Russia’s military capacity as a threat” or “Russia as a threat” will be used interchangeably in 
this thesis. The focus will however remain on Russia’s military capacity.  
6 The countries studied are Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. Iceland is excluded.  
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per cent in Norway (Nordicom 2010). Furthermore, ‘a media picture’ contains not only the 
perceptions of journalists but also by academics, interest groups and citizens themselves. In 
other words, the perception of Russia by the Nordic media picture is more representative of 
the wider social perception than that of Nordic political parties or political institutions.   
Based on this aim the following research questions have been formulated which will be 
further funneled down into more specific hypotheses.  
 To what extent is Russia’s military capacity depicted as a threat in Nordic 
newspapers? 
 Does this picture differ between the Nordic states? 
 What are the structural factors behind this picture? 
In the next section the literature on media pictures and the determinants of media perceptions 
will be examined, which will assist in formulating specific hypotheses. 
3 Literature review  
Presented below is an overview of the formation of media pictures. This boils down to the 
theoretical section about different structural factors expected to have impact on international 
relations as well as media pictures. 
 
A media picture concerns what is reported about a certain subject, and how this is reported. 
These pictures are underpinned by both subjective and objective factors
7
 (Riffe, Lacy and 
Fico 2005, 12-13). A subjective approach regards the media picture as a social construction 
created by news promoters, news assemblers and news consumers (Johnson-Cartee 2005, 
183). These groups can for example consist of politicians, journalists, editors, and the general 
audience (Asp 1986, 353-356). The interaction between these actors’ world views, interests 
and social backgrounds will construct the media picture (Falkheimer 2012, 159-160; Djerf-
Pierre and Wiik 2012, 193; Johnson-Cartee 2005, 183-218; Riffe, Lacy and Fico 2005, 10). 
Some subjective factors are similar across the Nordic states such as for example a high level 
of journalistic professionalism (Nord and Strömbäck 2012, 78). 
 
Objective factors, on micro level as well as on a structural macro level, have impact on media 
pictures. Factors on micro level can be the media company’s economic situation, the level of 
                                                          
7
 Also called Antecedent conditions in the literature. For example in Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005). 
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competition on the market or the news agency’s routines (Allern 2012, 244-250; Shoemaker 
and Reese 1996, 105-137). More revenue means more journalists and the ability to cover 
more stories, especially concerning specific foreign news such as Russia’s military capacity. 
The newspapers political belonging also influences what the media picture looks like (Höjelid 
1991, 114). Some objective factors on micro level are similar across the Nordic states such as 
having a well-developed mass press and Nordic wide media companies (Nord and Strömbäck 
2012, 83).  
 
On a macro level global economic, social and political structures influence the media content 
(Allern 2012, 244-250; Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 105-137).  The use of this kind of 
structural factors and others such as national traits and interactions, called systemic 
determinants, to explain international news coverage is used by for example H. Denis Wu 
(2000 and 2003). Research about this is quite scarce compared to that of subjective or micro 
level factors and is often overlooked in textbooks about media content
8
. Wu examines if 
systemic determinants, for example trade, colonial ties and GDP, influence how much a 
certain country’s media reports about another country. Wu finds that trade is the only 
systemic determinant that receives statistical significance across countries (Wu 2000; Wu 
2003). However other research in the field such as Wilke, Heimprecht and Cohen (2012) 
concludes that for example history does matter. Further research such as Wang and 
Shoemaker has found that political freedom in China positively correlated both with the level 
of media coverage and the general attitude towards China in the US (Wang and Shoemaker 
2011, 15). This means that the political factors also can be a part in shaping a media picture.  
Research in this field tends to only address the frequencies of which countries are mentioned 
in the media. This thesis will take this approach one step further and see to what extent 
systemic determinants influence Nordic media pictures. In other words, it will be empirically 
analyzed if for example the volume of trade has impact on to what extent Russia’s military 
capacity is described as a threat. Previous research has shown that the Nordic press 
description of Russia became more negative during Putin’s second term as president and after 
the South Ossetia war in 2008 (Rodin 2010, 125-12; Splidsboel Hansen 2010, 181). However 
it has not been studied or explained to what extent Russia’s military capacity is perceived as a 
threat.  
                                                          
8
 For example in Shoemaker and Reese 1996.  
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This thesis will not focus on subjective or objective factors on micro level factors since the 
purpose is to use the media as a reflector of objective structures in international relations. The 
systematic determinants that will be used to investigate this are based on factors derived from 
the following theory section.  
4 Theory  
Structural determinants can be objective factors at macro level. Within the international 
relations field there are two dominant macro-level theories, each of which focus at different 
structural factors underpinning international relations. After a brief presentation of these 
theories the specific systematic determinants that are predicted to influence the Russo-Nordic 
relation are introduced.  
4.1 Meta theories of international relations 
According to realism global politics is a constant power struggle and a wish for survival. The 
fundament is that people are driven by self-interests and, according to neo-realists, that there 
is anarchy on a supranational level. This anarchic structure is characterized by suspicion and 
that states have to take care of themselves as well as to seek relative gains. However this 
situation must not end in conflict since a balance of power can emerge (Heywood 2011, 53-
62). Factors such as military experiences and capacities are based on this of central 
importance in order to understand who, or what, is perceived as a threat. 
Liberalism shares many of the realism’s basic assumptions but emphasizes that lasting 
cooperation and peace is possible through economic interdependence and democratic peace 
(Heywood 2011, 61-65). For example well developed trade with Russia should result in a less 
threatful perception of it, while an undemocratic development in Russia should raise concern.  
The Nordic countries foreign policies are different concerning the balance between realism 
and liberalism. Denmark and Finland are seen as the two extremes where Denmark’s security 
policy has a cross-Atlantic orientation and is influenced by theories about complex 
interdependence and globalization. On the other hand Finland has a tradition of realpolitik 
based on having a deterring defense (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 11, 34, 120; 
Finnish government 2012,13; Salonius-Pasternak 2012) and self-censorship in order to never 
offend Russia (Salminen 1999, 5-7, 142; Doeser 2012, 171-172).  
The next section presents different individual systemic determinants predicted to influence 
international relations as well as media pictures.  
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4.2 Structural determinants 
 
Military capacity 
Military power is a central aspect of international relations according to realists. Waltz claims 
that this remains true also in the post-Cold War world since states still are dependent on self-
help and because military power is central to balance power in the emerging new multi-polar 
world order (Waltz 2000, 33-39). 
 
Russia is going through a comprehensive military reform where huge assets are put on 
modernizing its military
9
. The expenditure on military material is for example planned to 
increase tenfold between 2011 and 2020 (Hakvåg, Hove and Sendstad 2012, 3-7). This has 
made it possible for President Putin to say that for example 2300 news tanks, 600 airplanes 
and 50 combat ships will be procured in the years to come (Putin 2012). This military buildup 
is planned to lead to an increased presence of its armed forces in the Nordic countries’ near 
abroad (Rodin 2010, 128). 
 
Russia’s military capacity was what the Nordic countries, except Denmark in some cases 
(Ringsmose 2009, 90-91), used to scale their own defense ambitions after. This capacity 
constituted the background to Finland‘s appeasement policy and censored media (Salminen 
1999, 5-7, 142; Doeser 2012,171-172), NATO membership for Denmark (Jensen 1999, 653-
657; Christiansson 2012, 216), secret NATO guarantees for Sweden (Holmström 2011, 27-
35) and Norway’s traditional deterrent and appeasement policy (Höjelid 1991, 131).  
 
In today’s context the Nordic declaration of Solidarity can be partly seen as a reaction to the 
authoritarian development in Russia whose military capacity has reappeared as a potential 
problem as a result of the war in Georgia 2008 (Agrell 2010, 231). However the position on 
Russia’s military capacity also differs between the Nordic countries. Denmark’s security 
policy does not describe Russia as a problem at all (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 
2012, 22, 120) while Russia is still of great importance for Sweden’s security (Tunberger and 
Blomqvist 2012, 27; Doeser 2010, 163). Nevertheless Sweden in its latest comprehensive 
security policy update described environmental changes, not Russia, as the biggest threat 
(Försvarsdepartementet 2007). Norway sees NATO as central to national security in its 
“asymmetrical neighborhood (Solberg 2009, 505) and Finland emphasizes the importance of a 
                                                          
9
 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, 20 new multi-purpose 
submarines, 1000 helicopters, 2000 self-propelled artillery vehicles are also planned to be procured (Putin 2012). 
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deterring territorial defense (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 34,120; Finnish 
government 2012, 13; Salonius-Pasternak 2012).  
Russia’s military buildup has been elaborated upon by several authors (Hakvåg, Hove and 
Sendstad 2012; Johansson 2008; Lucas 2008; Nichol 2011; Vendil Pallin 2012 and 2013) but 
a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of this factor on the media picture of Russia’s 
military capacity and the Russo-Nordic relations is missing in the literature. Based on 
Russia’s role as the Nordics’ significant other Russia’s military expenditure constitute one of 
the two key independent variables. 
 
History 
The influence of history on international relations has been emphasized by theorists in the 
strategic culture discipline which see states’ strategic considerations as being so deeply 
embedded in culture and history that they take a significant amount of time to change. The 
core of the strategic culture theory is that historical experiences shape states’ interests and 
their use of military force (Neumann and Heikka 2005, 6-7). Research has shown that this is 
also the case for the Nordic countries (Howlet and Glenn 2005, 122).  
 
That history can influence news content has been questioned by Wu (2000 and 2003)
10
 but 
confirmed by Höjelid (1991), who in his dissertation concludes that history to some degree 
impacts the Nordic press picture of Russia. Further research about the Nordic countries shows 
how Finland’s enemy perception of the USSR was influenced by historical experiences such 
as the memory of being a part of the Russian empire and from the hostilities during the 
Second World War (Luostarinen 1989, 130-134). For Sweden the perception of Russia’s 
military capacity as a threat dates back hundreds of years and is based on numerous wars, not 
least the loss of Finland (Kahn 2009, 522-523; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001). Norway and 
Denmark are a little bit different since they are more oriented towards the West (Kolstø 1995, 
3) and do not have the same collective memories of Russia as an enemy (Christiansson 2012, 
203). Norway has for example never been in war with Russia, and Denmark’s last war against 
Russia ended in 1583. Nevertheless both Norway and Denmark used to perceive the Soviet 
Union as a threat (Rowe and Hønneland 2010, 133-147; Jensen 1999, 653-657; Christiansson 
2012, 216). 
 
                                                          
10
 Wu does not use the wording history but measure former colonial ties.  
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That the Nordics’ historical experiences influence strategic considerations has been confirmed 
(Howlet and Glenn 2005). However different researchers come to different conclusions 
regarding if history also can influence media content (Höjelid 1991; Wu 2000). This thesis 
therefore contributes to bring clarity in this area of research through conducting a systematic 
empirical analysis that quantifies historical memories in order to see if these have impact on 
the media picture of Russia’s military capacity. 
 
Trade 
The liberal perspective in international relations’ theory emphasizes how trade lowers the 
incentives for conflicts, even between countries with different political systems, since trade is 
seen as increasing interdependence (Haywood 2011, 62; Moravcsik 1992, 25-29). This 
correlation is confirmed by for example Polacheck and Seiglie (2006) but counter argued by 
realists like Waltz (2000, 14-18). 
 
Wu (2000, 126-127; 2003, 19) and Pietiläinen (2006) come to the conclusion that volume of 
trade is the single most important factor when explaining why certain countries are mentioned 
in another country’s media, especially in a post-Cold war context. However they just show 
that well developed trade leads to that a country will be mentioned more often increases but 
they do not empirically analyze how it will be mentioned.  
 
Literature about the Nordic states’ relationship with Russia emphasize how for example an 
increased trade lead to that the enemy picture of the USSR was dismantled in Finland and 
pragmatic relations was developed (Loustarinen 1989, 131)
11
. It is also the prospects of trade 
in its main export products, fish and fossil fuels, combined with Russia’s military build-up in 
the High-North, that have made Norway invest significant resources in new military material 
(Wezeman 2012.)
12
. 
 
In sum, research on both global and national level indicates that increasing trade correlates 
with a lower perception of the trading partner as a threat (Polacheck and Seiglie (2006; 
Loustarinen 1989), but a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of trade on the media 
picture of Russia’s military capacity has not been carried out.  
                                                          
11
 Russia is Finland’s biggest trading partner with around 14 per cent of the total trade. See appendix H.  
12
 New combat vehicles for 10 billion, frigates for 20 billion and fighter planes for 60 billion Norwegian crowns 
(1 euro ≈7,5 nok) (Aftenposten 31August 2006; Norway’s ministry of defence 2012) 
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Democracy 
The liberal theory within international relations claims that democracies rarely fight each 
other and that democratic political structures are essential for creating lasting peace 
(Moravcsik 1992, 17-21). This is supported by for example Rummel (1995) but argued 
against by others such as Walts (2000, 6-8). 
 
In this way the, by realists emphasized, security dilemma does not exist between democratic 
states, but it is still present between democracies and authoritarian states. Risse-Kappen 
(1995) mentions how an authoritarian development within a state therefore will lead to that its 
armed forces is perceived as dangerous by democracies, notwithstanding if the state is really 
aggressive or not (Risse-Kappen 1995, 506-509). In other words, Russia’s democratic 
development is an important determinant of its perception by others. This is in line with 
research about enemy pictures which show that the emergence of an enemy picture (a 
perception of a group as threat to the own security or values) in the media can be explained by 
both internal and external factors (Luostarinen 1989, 125-126). 
 
Russia is developing in an authoritarian direction and some authors talks about an emerging 
“new Cold War” (Lucas 2008, 18, 27, 269-270; Johansson 2008) A similar point of view is 
put forward by the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) which describes how Russia 
since 2004 under the concept of “Sovereign democracy” has eroded political rights 
(Konnander 2008). However from a Russian point of view the western powers let Russia 
down during the 1990’s (Rowe and Hønneland 2010, 142).  
 
Russia’s authoritarian development has been reported in Nordic media (Rodin 2010, 125-128; 
Splidsboel Hansen 2010, 181), but a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of this factor 
on the media picture of Russia’s military capacity and on the Russo-Nordic relations is 
missing in the literature.  
4.3 Theoretical predictions 
The theoretical expectations are summarized in the following hypotheses: 
H1: On average, the higher Russia’s military expenditure is, the more threatful is the media 
picture of Russia’s military capacity.  
H2: On average, the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the more 
threatful is the media picture of Russia’s military capacity.  
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H3: The effect of Russia’s military expenditures on the media picture of Russia varies with 
history: the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the stronger the impact 
of Russia’s military expenditures on the Nordic media picture of Russia as a threat. 
H4: On average, the higher the trade with Russia is, the less threatful is the media picture of 
Russia’s military capacity.  
 
H5: On average, the lower the Russia’s level of democracy, the more threatful is the media 
picture of Russia’s military capacity.  
5 Data and Methods 
This section provides an overview of the data and methods employed to test the hypothesis.   
5.1 Dependent variable 
In order to capture the media picture of Russia’s military capacity and test the hypotheses 
articles in major Nordic newspapers published between the years 2004 and 2012 that 
implicitly or explicitly mention this capacity have been used
13
. The articles come from two 
high-quality national daily newspapers per country, the biggest one produced in the capital 
and the biggest one produced outside of the capital. In most cases this selection constitutes the 
most influential newspapers in the country. For Finland only Hufvudstadsbladet has been used 
due to language considerations. Even if the whole Finnish media picture of Russia’s military 
capacity is not captured this newspaper acts as a sort of international Finnish information 
channel where a Finnish view on different issues is communicated (Höjelid 1991, 126). 
From the Retriever database a sample of five articles per newspaper/ year, altogether 293 
pieces, was randomly selected. For some newspapers less than five articles per year were 
available. This indicates that five articles is a good coverage of the entire population and that 
the use of smaller local newspapers would be insufficient. A large number of newspaper 
articles further have the advantage to include more claim makers than a governmental policy 
document would. In the end quite few people actually read for example the annual foreign 
affairs declaration compared to the number of people who reads about it, and other issues 
regarding Russia, in the newspaper.  
The time period, 2004-2012, is chosen because of Russia’s military reform starting in 2003 
and due to that Putin’s second term as president began in 2004 which is usually seen as the 
                                                          
13
 Information about the name, circulation and readership for each newspaper can be found in appendix D. 
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turning point towards a more authoritarian development. Russia’s military expenditure has 
more than doubled since 2004 and its democracy score has decreased sharply. This period 
therefore constitute a formative phase for the relationship between the Nordic states and 
Russia. These kind of formative phases are in the literature described to be crucial to 
understand why certain threat perceptions emerge (Eriksson 2004, 194-202).  
A quantitative content analysis is carried out on these articles in order to capture the Nordic 
media picture of Russia’s military capacity. How Russia’s military capacity is mentioned in 
these articles has been coded on a scale from 0 to 4 where zero equals no threat while four 
means that the article describes Russia’s military capacity as an immediate threat to Nordic 
values or existence
14
. A five point scale makes it possible to see variation in how Russia’s 
military capacity is described and to capture different nuances in the articles. A threatful 
perception can for example be hinted in a subtle way, be mentioned in a non-Nordic context, 
or be the main theme of the article. The result of this coding is transformed into a mean for 
each country and year which together forms the dependent variable. 
 
When coding the level of threat in the articles it has been taken into account if Russia’s 
military capacity was mentioned in a Nordic context, if Russia was promoted as an enemy, 
how the own defense capacity was described, if there was a pressure for Nordic politicians to 
take action as well as how the language, headlines and the theme of the article was structured. 
This is inspired by research about enemy images of Höjelid (1991) and Ottosen (1993) as well 
as by McCombs (2006) concept of framing, J.W Tankard’s suggestion about how to code a 
certain news picture
15
 and the guidelines to content analyze presented in Riffe et al (2005). 
Through using this quantitative approach it is possible to go through a large amount of 
articles. This makes it possible to see a clearer pattern than what would be possible for the 
“naked eye” alone. Even though the coding is based on guidelines from previous research 
there is room for subjectivity which can influence the reliability of the measure. Below are a 
couple of short coding examples. 
 
Examples of coding 
An article that was coded 0 (No threat) was Försvarsanslaget kan minska drastiskt published 
in Dagens Nyheter (SE) 2004/01/03. The article mentions that it is important for Sweden that 
                                                          
14
 The author has a document in which the coding of each article is briefly explained. Can be handed out at 
request. 
15
 Tankard’s list is mentioned in Johson-Cartee (2005, 73). All aspects of it have not been used.  
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Russia increases its military capacity as illustrated by the quote “A military weak Russia has 
been prefered. But not any longer”. It is further mentioned that this process is going too 
slowly and that Sweden should decrease its own defense spending.  
 
A small or hinted threat, coded 1, was found in Nasjonalistisk sikkerhet? published in 
Aftenposten (NO), 2005/09/07. The article is a piece in a debate about if Norway should 
prioritize the military defense in the High-North or not. Russia’s military capacity is not the 
main theme in the article and Russia is mentioned as only one of several states with military 
activity in the High-North. However Russia’s military capacity is mentioned as something 
that do influence Norway’s policy, it is said in a Nordic context and Russia is hinted to be if 
not an enemy at least a potential problem as seen in the quote “The Norwegian military’s 
presence is not aimed only against the Russians (…) but against all the actors in the northern 
areas to the same extent.”. Based on this the article was coded 1, that it promoted a picture of 
Russia as a slight threat in the passing that might not have been obvious to the reader. 
 
An example of an article that was coded 2, that a clear threat was expressed, was 
Sikkerhedspolitikkens geografiske krav in Jyllands-Posten (DK), 2004/01/09. The author of 
the article argues for stronger national defense based on the increased geopolitical importance 
of the near abroad and because of Russia’s increasing unpredictability. The author claims that 
"Conflicts with Russia can develop anytime in Denmark’s near abroad” which should 
influence the national policy. However Russia’s military capacity is not the main theme of the 
article and only plays a limited role in the author’s argumentation.  
 
A clearly manifested threat with a Nordic dimension, coded 3, was present in Ökar Ryssland 
sin kapacitet i Östersjön? Published in Hufvudstadsbladet (FI), 2009/12/06. The article’s 
main theme is how Russia increases its military presence in the Nordics’ near abroad which is 
manifested in the quote “The Russian armed forces are clearly practicing for the upcoming 
struggle for the northern polar region's natural wealth”. Russia’s military is described as 
having offensive capabilities and it is mentioned how this will increase in the years to come. It 
is clearly mentioned that this offensive capacity increases the uncertainty regarding Russia’s 
ambitions in the Nordic near abroad. Russia is further promoted as the only security problem 
to the Nordic countries. The author clearly says that this should influence Finnish policy.  
 13 
 
5.2 Independent variables 
To answer the explanatory part of the research questions regarding what structural factors 
explains the Nordic media’s position on Russia’s military capacity the following independent 
variables have been developed. The theoretical background to them has been presented in the 
theory section.  
Russia’s military expenditure variable 
The key independent variable in this analysis is Russia’s military expenditure. Statistics about 
Russia’s defense budget (in constant 2011 US dollars) from the SIPRI database on military 
expenditure
16
 has been used as a measure of its military capacity which constitutes the main 
independent variable. It could be measured in other ways, for example the number of soldiers 
or tanks in the Russian army. However such a measure would lack validity since it would not 
take into account the quality of the weaponry or how well trained the soldiers are which is of 
increasing importance in modern high-tech warfare.  
History variable  
Another key explanatory variable is collective historical memories (History in the regression 
tables). The historical facts behind the below presented measures are taken from the Swedish 
Nationalencyklopedin and CIA factbook.   
In order to operationalize collective memories, every war between each Nordic country and 
Russia has been scored through a certain point system based on the number of decades since 
the war took place. Had a war taken place in 2012 that war would receive 100 points. For 
each of the ten first decades (<100 years) since the conflict the score decreases with 1 point 
per decade. To illustrate how memories fade over time the score has an escalating effect 
meaning that the following ten decades (100-199 years since the conflict) the conflict score 
decreases with 3 points per decade. For the next ten decades (200-299 years since the conflict) 
it decreases with 5 points per decade etc. This means that each conflict the last 32 decades 
(since 1693) will receive a positive score. All the wars before 1693 have been scored with 1 
point.  
For example Finland’s Continuation War against the USSR which ended 69 years ago 
therefore recieves 94 points (100 – number of decades multiplied with the escalating effect 
(6*1) = 94). The Great Northern War in which Sweden and Russia were on different sides 
                                                          
16
 This data on Russia’s military expenditure 2004-2012 is found in appendix E. 
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ended 291 years ago and was scored 15 points (100 – number of decades (29) multiplied with 
the escalating effect  (10*1) + (10*3) + (9*5) = 85. 100 – 85 = 15 points.)   
The robustness check variable of historical experience (History_robustness in the regression 
tables) of Russia as a foe was operationalized through taking the number of armed conflicts 
between the different Nordic states and Russia, divided by the number of years since the last 
war, and multiply this number with 100
17
. The idea is that this index to some extent measures 
the past interaction (number of wars) with Russia and the devaluation time of collective 
memories (years since last war).  
The indexes are somewhat biased since Finland and Norway have been independent much 
shorter time than Sweden and Denmark. Nevertheless the result of both the main history and 
robustness history indexes is in line with previous research which highlights that for example 
Norway and Denmark has limited collective memories of armed conflicts with Russia 
(Christiansson 2012, 203). Finland on the other hand fought the USSR not that long ago while 
the Swedish perception of the Russia as the arch-enemy dates back hundreds of years (Kahn 
2009, 522-523; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001).  
In the end, to create a measure of collective historic memory with high validity is hard and 
does not seem to have been done before. This is a first try at stepping up to that challenge.  
Interaction variable 
An interaction term between the key independent variables, Russia’s military expenditure and 
history, is used to capture the conditionality of the Russia’s military expenditures’ effect on 
the dependent variable. Since previous research highlights how Russia’s military capacity 
throughout history has had a significant impact on the Nordic countries (Rodin 2010, 121-
126), it is reasonable to expect that the effect of predictor 1 (Russia’s military expenditures) 
on the response variable y (Nordic media picture of Russia as a threat) depends on another 
predictor (the nature of historical experience).  
 
Trade variable 
The volume of trade between each Nordic country and Russia 2004-2012 is derived from 
OECD and Statistics Sweden. For each Nordic country the total import and export to Russia 
has been divided by the country’s total global export and import. In this way a percentage is 
                                                          
17
 Number of wars and when these conflicts took place is found in appendix F. For statistical computing reason 
Norway has been coded to have a value slightly bigger than zero.  
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achieved which shows how important Russia is as a trading partner for each Nordic country. 
Since the measurement is based on globally accessible and accepted statistics it has high 
reliability and acceptable validity. 
 
Democracy variable 
Russia’s level of democracy 2004-2012 has been measured using Freedom House Imputed 
Polity Democracy score
18
, (published in the Quality of Governance institute at the University 
of Gothenburg 2012 standard dataset), which take into account civil liberties and political 
rights. This scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. 
Freedom House democracy score is a widely used categorization that is open to the public, 
implying that it has high validity and reliability.   
 
In sum, the dataset constructed as a result of the above mentioned efforts is a time-series cross 
sectional data set with 36 country/ year observation (2004-2012) and the above mentioned 
variables. It will be analyzed using appropriate statistical methods.  
6 Analyses and results 
This section begins with a presentation of to what extent Russia’s military capacity is 
described as threat in Nordic newspapers. This descriptive phase is followed by an 
explanatory part where the impact of structural factors on the Nordic media picture is tested. 
The section concludes with a discussion of major findings.  
6.1 The Nordic newspapers picture of Russia’s military capacity as a threat 
In order to answers the first two research question, “to what extent is Russia’s military 
capacity pictured as a threat in Nordic newspapers?” and “Does this picture differ between 
the Nordic states?” the dependent variable of the study will be explored in detail.  
As Table 1 shows the majority of the articles across the four Nordic countries, nearly 50 
percent of the total, portray Russia as no threat at all. Almost 29 percent of articles in the 
researched sample of the Nordic newspapers describe Russia as a small threat. At the same 
time, 23 percent of articles portray Russia as a clear threat, including almost 7 percent that 
emphasize the Nordic dimension of the threat. Finally, none of the articles under 
consideration picture Russia as ‘an immediate threat to Nordic values or existence’.  
                                                          
18
 Russia’s Freedom House Imputed Polity Democracy score 2004-2012 is found in appendix H.  
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Table 1: The Nordic newspaper articles mentioning Russia’s military capacity categorized (%)  
 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Nordic total 
not at all (0) 67.5 42.9 48.8 31.8 48.1 (140) 
little / to some extent (1) 20.0 31.0 32.1 31.8 28.5 (83) 
clear threat (2) 11.2 21.4 9.5 27.1 16.8 (49) 
clear threat with Nordic 
dimension (3) 
1.2 4.8 9.5 9.4 6.5 (19) 
Immidiate threat to Nordic 
values/ existence (4) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Total 100 (80) 100 (42) 100 (84) 100,0 (85) 100 (291) 
Source: Authors calculation on articles published in major Nordic newspapers 2004-2012. Frequency of 
articles in parentheses.  
 
Table 1 also shows that the media picture of Russia’s military capacity varies across Nordic 
countries. Thus, whilst more than two thirds of articles in the Danish media portray Russia as 
no threat, in Sweden this perception can be found only in about one thirds of the articles. In 
Norway about half of all coded articles depict Russia as no threat, and about 43 percent of 
relevant articles from the Finnish newspaper hold a similar view.  
Table 1 further demonstrates that around one third of the articles in both Finland and Norway 
as well as in Sweden perceive Russia’s military capacity as a small or hinted threat. In 
Denmark a fifth of the articles contain a similar picture.  
According to table 1 a clear picture of Russia’s military capacity as a threat is expressed in 
about a tenth of the Danish and Norwegian newspaper articles. A fifth of the articles in 
Finland have the same clear picture of Russia’s military capacity as a threat and 27 percent of 
the Swedish articles have a similar view. 
As can be observed in table 1 close to ten percent of the articles in Norway and Sweden holds 
a picture of Russia’s military capacity as a clear threat with a Nordic dimension. In Finland 
close to five percent of the coded articles depict Russia as a clear threat with a Nordic 
dimension, only about 1 percent of the Danish articles holds a similar picture.  
Finally table 1 shows that not a single article, in any of the Nordic countries, portrays Russia’s 
military capacity as an immediate threat to the Nordics’ existence or values. 
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Graph 1 presents the same data, allowing to observe the average level of perceived threat by 
country/ year. 
Graph 1: The yearly average perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat in the 
Nordic countries newspapers 2004-2012. (Author’s calculations) 
 
The graph suggests that Denmark has the lowest average perception of threat regarding 
Russia’s military capacity in eight out of nine years.  The average fluctuates over time from 0 
in year 2006 to 0.78 in year 2011. 
 
According to graph 1 Sweden has the highest average perception of threat regarding Russia’s 
military capacity in five out of nine years. The mean ranges from 0.56 in year 2010 to 1.5 in 
year 2005 and 2010.  
 
The graph suggests that Finland’s average perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat 
is quite stable over time with the exception of its lowest score 0.2 in 2006 and its highest 1.2 
in 2005. Finland has the highest average in two out of nine years. 
 
Norway’s threat perception fluctuates greatly over time according to graph 1. The average 
perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat ranges from 0.38 in year 2006 to 1.3 in 
2009 and 2011. Norway’s has both the lowest level of perceived threat 0.56 in 2007 and the 
highest with 1.3 in both 2008 and 2010. 
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In sum, graph 1 shows that there is no clear pattern concerning the Nordic perception of 
Russia’s military capacity as a threat under the period of study. However, simple frequency 
and graphical illustration are not enough to state that there is a meaningful difference in the 
perception of Russia as a threat between the Nordic countries. In order to establish means 
difference between groups an one-way ANOVA test was performed. It shows that there is a 
statistically significant mean difference between the countries (F(3,32) = 7.512, p = .001). As 
the data meets the assumptions of homogeneity and variance the Tukey’s honestly significant 
difference test is used to determine where the differences occurred between groups. The 
Tukey’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean threat of Denmark (.453 ± .264) is to a 
statistically significant extent different from that of Sweden (1.14 ± .345, p = .000) and 
Finland (.889 ± .284, p = .028). The means difference between Norway (.778 ± .345) and the 
other countries is not statistically significant. Neither was the one between Sweden and 
Finland. Graph 2 below depicts the means with 95% confidence intervals between Nordic 
countries. 
 
Graph 2: The mean with CI of the Nordic media’s perception of Russia’s military 
capacity as a threat 2004-2012. (Author’s calculations) 
 
 
This section has reported to what extent Russia’s military capacity is perceived as a threat in 
the Nordic newspapers, and how the level of threat differs between the Nordic countries. The 
frequency analysis (table 1) showed that Russia’s military capacity was in about half of the 
analyzed articles promoted as a threat. Out of all articles this threat is mostly hinted or 
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mentioned in the passing (28.5 percent) but also portrayed as a clear threat (16.8 percent) and 
to a smaller extent mentioned as an clear threat with a Nordic dimension (6.5 percent).  
 
A frequency table (Table 1), country/ year graph (Graph 1) and one-way ANOVA test was 
used to see if the extent to which Russia’s military capacity was pictured as a threat differed 
between the Nordic countries.  
 
The extent to which Russia’s military capacity is pictured as a threat in Danish media is lower 
in all threat categories compared to the other countries. That Denmark has a lower average 
perception of threat (.453 ± .264) in almost all the studied years compared to the other 
countries is illustrated in graph 1. The one-way ANOVA test showed that Denmark’s threat 
mean was statistically significantly different from that of Finland and Sweden.  
 
Sweden is the opposite of Denmark since it tends to have the highest, or close to highest, 
frequency in all the threat categories in table 1. Sweden’s average threat perception fluctuated 
over time (1.14 ± .345) but was the highest in five out of nine years. Sweden’s mean threat 
perception was statistically significant different from Denmark’s. 
 
Finland has across the different threat categories in the frequency table (table 1) almost the 
same percentages as Sweden. Finland’s average perception of Russia’s military capacity as a 
threat is also, like Sweden’s, statistically significant different from Denmark’s. Finland’s 
average threat is quite stable over time as illustrated both in graph 1 and by having the lowest 
standard deviation (.889 ± .284).  
 
Norway has the second lowest average threat (.778 ± .345) which fluctuated significantly over 
time. Concerning mean differences Norway’s was not different to a statistically significant 
extent from the other Nordic countries, illustrating that it forms a middle ground between 
Finland and Sweden with high threat means and Denmark’s low one.  
 
To conclude, Russia’s military capacity was depictured as a threat to differing extents in the 
Nordic media 2004-2012. The perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat 
significantly differs between the Nordic countries. Factors underlying this dependent variable 
are tested in the following section. 
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6.2 Determinants of the Nordic media picture of Russia’s military capacity 
as a threat 
 
As a way of testing the hypotheses this section evaluates how well structural factors predict 
the extent to which Russia’s military capacity is described as a threat in Nordic newspapers. 
Given a limited nature of the time-series cross-section data the Prais-Winsten regression is 
used. Prais-Winsten regressions is a method of estimating a multiple linear regression model 
using exogenous independent variables and transforming the dataset to correct for serial 
correlation in the error terms. As a less conservative test (compared to for example fixed 
effects models) Prais-Winsten allows to investigate the change over time and across panels in 
datasets of limited nature. A particular strength of Prais-Winsten is that it provides sufficient 
controls for autocorrelation in the data (Alonso et al 2010).  
Table 2 presents the result of the regression analysis. The main finding across the five models 
is the statistically significant effect in the predicted direction by the history and trade 
predictors. 
Table 2: Estimated impact of structural factors on the level of threat concerning 
Russia’s military capacity expressed in Nordic newspapers. 
DV: Threat mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Russia’s military 
expenditure 
2.28 
(4.54) 
2.52 
(3.94) 
3.77 
(3.53) 
4.25 
(6.23) 
6.08 
(7.14) 
       
History  0.002*** 0.003** 0.003
**
 .01* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
Trade   -0.04* -0.04* -0.034* 
   (0.02) (0.02) (.018) 
      
Democracy     0.01 0.01 
    (0.12) (0.12) 
      
History*Russia’s 
military expenditure  
    -2.15 
(3.70) 
      
Constant 0.66
*
 0.46 0.41 0.33 0.21 
 (0.31) (0.27) (0.24) (0.93) .96 
N 36 36 36 36 36 
rho 0.24 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
R
2
 0.01 0.21 0.35 0.35 0.36 
Note: Estimates are based on panel corrected standard errors using Prais-Winsten regression. Panel 
corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Model 1: The first model shows to what extent Russia’s military expenditure, which 
measures its military capacity, impacts the level of threat expressed in the Nordic states 
newspapers. Russia’s military expenditure variable is not statistically significant. Since this is 
one of the main independent variables, with a strong theoretical background, it is included in 
Model 2 as well. 
 
Model 2: In this model, the variable History that aims at capturing historical memories of 
Russia as a military threat is added to the equation. This history variable is significant at the 
0.001 level and its impact is positive as predicted. That is, on average the more troublesome 
the history of Russia-Nordic relations the greater the current perception of Russia’s military 
capacities as a threat. At the same time Russia’s military expenditure is not statistically 
significant. These two variables explain about a one-fifth of the variation in the dependent 
variable. This is a considerable increase compared to Model 1, which can largely be attributed 
to the included History variable.  
 
Model 3: In the third model the variable Trade, measuring the level of trade between the 
Nordic countries and Russia, is added to the equation. The Trade variable is significant at the 
0.05 level and its impact is negative as predicted. This means that on average the higher the 
level of trade with Russia, the lower the perception of its military capacity as a threat. The 
History variable is like in Model 2 significant, this time at the 0.01 level. Russia’s military 
expenditure is similar to the two previous models not statistically significant. These three 
variables explains around a third of the variation in the dependent variable. This is a 
substantial increase compared to Model 2 which can be attributed to the Trade variable.  
Model 4: Democracy, capturing the level of democracy in Russia, is added to the equation in 
the fourth model. The democracy variable is not significant and it does not increase the R
2
 
compared to the previous model. This shows that the level of democracy does not influence 
the level of threat in Nordic newspapers. The effect of both History and Trade are robust to 
inclusion of the democracy variable. Russia’s military expenditure is still not statistically 
significant.  
Model 5: In the fifth model the interaction term between Russia’s military expenditure and 
history has been added to the previously mentioned independent variables. This interaction 
term is not significant, and it only marginally improves the R
2
 compared to Model 4. The 
effect of both History and Trade does not change when the interaction term is included.  
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Patterns in the determinants impact on the dependent variable 
In the above presented table some patterns regarding the independent variables are found. 
Russia’s military expenditure is not statistically significant in any of the five models it is 
included in. This remains true also under favorable conditions when it forms an interaction 
term together with history. In the first model where Russia’s military expenditure is the only 
predictor the R
2
 is very low (R
2
 = 0.01) indicating that there is something within this variable 
that behaves differently from the dependent variable. 
The effect of History is statistically significant and in the predicted direction in all models it is 
included in. This is interpreted as that history has an influence on the level of threat attributed 
to Russia’s military capacity in Nordic newspapers, even when controlled for Russia’s 
military expenditure, trade level, democracy score and the interaction term between the key 
two predictors. It means that the more troublesome the history, the more threatful the current 
perception of Russia. This finding is in line with the literature on Nordic-Russia relations 
which underscores the importance of the history between these actors of international 
relations. However the quantitative significance of this effect is difficult to assess due to the 
measurement of the variable ranges from 1 to around 187 across panels but stationary time-
wise. 
The effect of Trade is statistically significant and in the predicted direction in all models it is 
included in. The negative effect does only change to a limited extent across the models (from 
-0.04 in model 3 and 4, to -0.034 in model 5). The negative effect is in line with the 
predictions and implies that as trade with Russia increases, the perception of it as a threat 
decrease (when controlled for by Russia’s military expenditure, democracy, history and the 
interaction term). The effect is however quite limited, meaning that as trade with Russia 
increase with one percent, the threat level on average decrease with 0.04 points. 
The democracy variable, based on the Freedom House index, is not statistically significant in 
any of the models it is included in. 
The interaction term between Russia’s military expenditure and history is not statistically 
significant. This means that the effect of Russia’s military expenditure on the dependent 
variable does not depend upon history. The lack of statistically significant effect for the 
interaction term gives further support to that Russia’s military expenditure lacks explanatory 
power. 
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This first set of regressions indicates that two of the five hypotheses (H2 and H4) might be 
supported since history and trade is statistically significant in all models they are inserted in 
and their effect is in the predicted direction. That the final fifth model, where history and trade 
are statistically significant, explains 36 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is 
satisfying when taking into account that a media picture is also the result of subjective factors 
that have not been addressed in this thesis. However the result of this first set of regression is 
depending on the history variable which, as mentioned in the method section, has room for 
subjectivity. Ta capture collective memories numerically on country level in a way that is 
generally accepted way is hard. Even if the measure has a good reliability its validity is not of 
questioning. Based on this a robustness test will be run in order to validate the results.  
Robustness check 
In the previous section history and trade was found to have statistically significant influence 
on the level of threat expressed concerning Russia’s military capacity in Nordic newspaper. 
The trade variable is based on official trade statistics and therefore has a high validity. This is 
not the case for the history variable which is based on the authors own calculations. In order 
to see if history really does influence the dependent variable a robustness test is conducted. 
Once again Prais-Winsten regressions and the same variables are used except that the variable 
called History_robustness replace the history variable used in the previous section.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis constituting the robustness check. 
History robustness is the only predictor to have explanatory power on the dependent variable. 
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Table 3: Robustness check on estimated impact of structural factors on the level of 
threat concerning Russia’s military capacity expressed in Nordic newspapers.  
DV: Threat mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Russia’s military 
expenditure 
2.28 
(4.54) 
3.05 
(3.57) 
3.33 
(3.57) 
3.73 
(6.25) 
6.04 
(7.90) 
       
History_robustness  0.11*** 0.12** 0.12
**
 .20 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (.14) 
      
Trade   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Democracy     0.01 0.01 
    (0.12) (0.12) 
      
History*Russia’s 
military expenditure 
    -1.16 
2.14 
      
Constant 0.66
*
 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.18 
 (0.31) (0.25) (0.25) (0.93) 0.98 
N 36 36 36 36 36 
rho 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
R
2
 0.011 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.34 
Note: Estimates are based on panel corrected standard errors using Prais-Winsten regression. Panel corrected 
standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Model 1: This is exactly the same equation as the first model in the previous regression table 
(Table 2) since the only difference between the regression tables is how the history variable is 
constructed. Like in the previous set of regressions, Russia’s military expenditure variable is 
not statistically significant. In order to see if Russia’s military expenditure has any 
explanatory power when the new history variable is used it will be inserted in the following 
models as well. 
Model 2: In order to see if the findings from the previous regression table (Table 2) are robust 
a history variable based on another calculation is added to the equation in the second model. 
The History robustness variable is significant at the 0.001 level and its impact is positive as 
predicted. Precisely as for the previous History variable this means that on average the more 
violent the history with Russia the greater the current perception of Russia’s military capacity 
as a threat. At the same time Russia’s military expenditure is not statistically significant. 
These two variables explain close to a one-third of the variation in the dependent variable. 
This is a considerable increase compared to Model 1, which can essentially be attributed to 
the included History robustness variable. 
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Model 3: Trade is added to the equation in the third model. Trade was statistically significant 
in the previous set of regressions (Table 2) but this is not the case in this model. The History 
robustness variable is significant at the 0.01 level while Russia’s military expenditure is still 
not significant. This model explains 32 percent of the variation in the dependent variable 
which is slightly higher than in Model 2. 
Model 4: In the fourth model Democracy is added to the previously mentioned variables. The 
democracy variable is not significant and it does not increase the R
2
 compared to the previous 
model. The history variables positive effect and its significance as well as the models r-square 
does not change when Democracy is added to the equation. Russia’s military expenditure is 
still not statistically significant. 
Model 5: In the fifth and last model the interaction term between Russian military 
expenditure and History robustness is added to the previously mentioned independent 
variables. This is based on that even though Russia’s military expenditure has not been 
statistically significant in the previous models its effect on the dependent variable might 
depend on the effect of the history robustness variable. However this is not supported since 
this interaction term is not significant, and it only marginally improves the R
2
 compared to 
Model 4. The statistically significant effect of History disappears meaning history is not 
robust to the inclusion of the interaction term. 
Patterns in the robustness check 
To robustness check will now be summed up and related to the previous findings in the first 
set of regressions (Table 2). 
The variable measuring Russia’s military expenditure is not statistically significant in any of 
the models, either in table 2 or 3, not even when Russia’s military expenditure varies together 
with history in the interaction term. The low R
2
 in the first model in both tables (Table 2 and 
3) further suggest that there is something within this variable that behaves very different from 
the dependent variable. The Russian military expenditure predictor will therefore be further 
investigated in the discussion section. 
In table 3 the History robustness variable is statistically significant in the predicted direction 
in all models it participates in except the fifth where it is neither statistically significant on its 
own or as an interaction term with Russia’s military spending. This shows that History 
robustness has explanatory power on the dependent variable when controlled for by trade, 
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democracy and Russia’s military expenditure. The history robustness predictor’s effect in the 
predicted direction increases only slightly (from b = 0.11 to b = 0.12) across the models. This 
is a stronger effect than the previous history variable had. The stronger effect is supposedly 
due to the smaller scale of the robustness measure which ranges from 0.23 to 4.62. Taken 
together the robustness variable therefore confirms the influence of history from the first 
regression table (Table 2). 
The trade variable is not statistically significant in any of the models it is included in. This is a 
difference from the first set of regressions (Table 2) in which trade was statistically significant 
in all models it participated in. 
The democracy variable is not statistically significant in any of the models it is included in. 
This is the same result as from the first set of regressions (Table 2). This means that as 
Russia’s level of democracy decreases, it is not possible to conclude that this has an effect of 
the level of threat expressed concerning Russia’s military capacity in Nordic newspapers. 
The interaction term between Russia’s military expenditure and History robustness is not 
statistically significant. This means that the effect of Russia’s military expenditure on the 
dependent variable does not depend upon history, irrespective of how history is measured.  
The lack of statistically significant effect for the interaction term gives further support to that 
Russia’s military expenditure lacks observed effect on the level of threat regarding Russia’s 
military capacity in Nordic newspapers.  
In sum, the statistically significant effect of History robustness in the predicted direction is in 
line with the original history variable. The stability of the robustness measure is further 
strengthened by that the R
2
 scores for both of the most statistically significant models in table 
2 and table 3 are very similar. (Table 2: Model 5, R
2
 = .36; Table 3, Model 4, R
2
 = .32). 
Together the result of the two history variables confirm that the influence of history on the 
extent to which Russia’s military capacity is pictured as a threat in Nordic media is robust. 
The results will in the following section be discussed and connected to the hypotheses. 
6.3 Discussion of the results  
This section discusses the empirical results from this study in relation to the research 
questions, hypotheses and previous research. 
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The media picture 
By exploring the dependent variable, the extent to which Russia’s military capacity was 
depicted as a threat in Nordic media between the years 2004 and 2012 it was possible to find 
out the answer for the first research questions: To what extent is Russia’s military capacity 
depicted as a threat in Nordic newspapers? 
The statistics (see Table 1) showed that more than half of the analyzed articles described 
Russia’s military capacity as a threat. Based on this it is indeed possible to say that Russia’s 
military capacity to some extent is pictured as a threat in Nordic media. This result further 
shows that the media picture of Russia’s military capacity is of importance to investigate. The 
analysis also showed that Russia’s military capacity is to none extent pictured as an 
immediate threat to the Nordics’ existence, and only to a limited degree pictured as a clear 
threat with a Nordic dimension. This means that almost half of the coded articles (46 percent) 
end up in either of the categories “small/ hinted threat” or as “a clear threat obvious to the 
reader”. Concerning to what extent Russia’s military capacity is pictured as a threat it is 
therefore possible to conclude that, from an overarching perspective, Russia’s military 
capacity is foremost pictured as a small threat in Nordic media, but also to some extent 
mentioned as a clear threat.  
These confirms general findings of the literature (for example Rodin 2010; Splidsboel Hansen 
2010; Rowe and Hønneland 2010; Oredsson 2003; Höjelid 1991). However it is important to 
mention that the findings of this research are contingent on the quality of the newspapers 
sample and measurement of the extent of the perception of Russia as a threat, which contains 
some amount of subjectivity.  
Further reconnection to the literature will be made in the next section which answers the 
research questions regarding differences between the Nordic countries.  
Differences between the Nordic countries 
The result of looking deeper into the dependent variable further showed that there were 
differences between the Nordic states concerning to the extent of their media perceived 
Russia’s military capacity as a threat. That the countries had different averages were indicated 
in the frequency table (Table 1), graphically illustrated (graph 1) and finally statistically 
confirmed in a one-way ANOVA test. These results makes it possible to conclude that, the 
extent to which Russia’s military capacity is depicted as a threat differs between the Nordic 
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states. Namely, Denmark appeared to have the lowest average of the perceived threat. 
Sweden, followed by Finland, had the highest average threat which were statistically 
significant different from Denmark’s. Norway ended up in between the Finnish-Swedish 
block and Denmark. 
The fact that Denmark  has the lowest average threat perception was to some extent expected 
since Denmark’s security policy is the only one that does not describe Russia as a problem at 
all (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012). Even if previous research have not really 
measured and compared the different Nordic countries threat perceptions in a quantitative 
way it is no surprise that Norway has the second lowest average threat since the literature 
points out how Norway and Denmark are more oriented westwards than Sweden and Finland 
(Kolstø 1995). Meaning they are not gazing as much towards Russia as Sweden and Finland.  
That Sweden has the highest average threat perception, higher than Finland, is a bit surprising. 
Nevertheless the literature pointed out how the perception of Russia as Sweden’s arch enemy 
dates back hundreds of years (Kahn 2009; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001). That Finland has 
one of the highest threat perception of Russia’s military capacity is not strange since this 
perceived threat is Finland’s motivation to keep a strong deterring defense (Christiansson, 
Westberg and Wiklund 2012; Finnish government 2012; Salonius-Pasternak 2012). 
To conclude, there are differences between the Nordic countries regarding to what extent 
Russia’s military capacity is perceived as a threat in the media. That there might also be a 
variance over time, with year 2006 being significantly lower than the other years was hinted 
in graph 1. That this is indeed the case is illustrated in graph 2 below. 
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Graph 3: The Nordic annual average of threat concerning Russia’s military capacity 
with standard deviation (Author’s calculation) 
 
The graph suggests that the Nordic countries average threat concerning Russia’s military 
capacity year 2006 (3 on the X scale) was indeed significantly lower than that of other years. 
This variation in the dependent variable can explain low explanatory powers of the models, as 
linear regression might not be the best fit for the model in which one of the key indipendent 
variables (Russia’s military expenditure) is gradually increasing. In addition the fact that a 
media picture could be explained not only by structural factors but also by different subjective 
factors that are not addressed in this thesis, may stand behind the relatively low values of R
2
 
statistics through the analaysis. Next section will answer how the dependent variable, the 
media picture of Russia’s military capacity, was affected by the structural factors.   
The hypotheses regarding the influence of structural determinants 
The following section will answer the last research question regarding what the structural 
factors behind the media picture of Russia’s military capacity are. It proceeds by evaluating 
five individual hypotheses derived from relevant theoretical literature on structural 
determinants in international relations.  
Hypothesis 1: On average, the higher Russia’s military expenditure is, the more threatful is 
the media picture of Russia’s military capacity.  
Overall, the hypothesis does not find support in data. As is shown in all models of the two 
regression tables (Table 2 and 3) Russia’s military expenditure was not statistically significant 
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in predicting the extent to which Russia’s military capacity was pictured as a threat in the 
media.  
These findings are not in line with previous research such as Waltz (2000) and Rodin (2010). 
Even if the literature emphasized that Russia’s military capacity was what the Nordic 
countries used to scale their own defense ambitions after it also opened up for the opportunity 
that the Nordic countries traditionally might have perceived this capacity somewhat 
differently (Ringsmose 2009; Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012).  
The differences between countries might be the reason for the expenditure variable’s low R2 
(0.01) and lack of significance. Since Russia’s military expenditure is one of the key variables 
this non-significant effect is further explored through looking at the relation between the 
threat level and Russia’s military expenditure for each country.  
The following graphs show how the relation between threat perception and Russia’s military 
expenditure looks like for each country. It further shows how many of the observations for 
each country that falls inside the 95 per cent confidence interval which is a range of scores 
constructed such that the population mean will fall within this range in 95 percent of the 
samples. The main finding is that the correlation between level of threat expressed in media 
and Russia’s military expenditure behaves differently for the Nordic countries. 
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Graph 4: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Denmark, 2004-2012. 
(Author’s calculations)  
 
Denmark 
Graph 4 shows that as Russia’s military expenditure increases, the perception of it as a threat 
in Danish newspaper slightly decreases. However there are some outliers. This is to some 
extent in line with literature mentioning how Denmark’s security policy, unlike those of the 
other Nordic countries, does not describe Russia as a problem at all (Christiansson, Westberg 
and Wiklund 2012).  
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Graph 5: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Norway, 2004-2012. 
(Author’s calculations) 
 
Norway 
Regarding Norway graph 5 shows that as Russia’s military expenditure increases, the 
perception of it as a threat in Norwegian newspaper increase. An interpretation of this is that 
in the case of Norway Russia’s military expenditure might actually have an impact on the 
level of threat expressed in media. Since the findings in this thesis is about averages, for all 
Nordic countries, the relationship in one-fourth of the data don’t bear on the relationship for 
the whole data. Previous literature mentioned how Norway sees NATO as central to national 
security in its “asymmetrical neighborhood (Solberg 2009) and that it has made huge military 
investments (Aftenposten 31August 2006; Norway’s Ministry of Defence 2012). Norway’s 
asymmetrical neighborhood is the high-North where Norway has for the country vital interest 
in natural resources. As mentioned in the introduction Russia is planning to increase its 
military power in this area. This might be one factor behind the in graph 3 illustrated 
correlation.  
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Graph 6: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Finland, 2004-2012. 
(Author’s calculations) 
 
Finland 
Graph 6 shows that as Russia’s military expenditure increases, the perception of it as a threat 
in Finnish newspapers does not change. One interpretation of this finding is that the Russian 
threat is so deeply embedded in Finnish culture that it will remain stable regardless of the 
level of Russia’s military capacity. This interpretation would to some extent be in line with 
literature mentioning how Finland has a tradition of keeping a deterring defense. As 
mentioned in the methods section only one Finnish newspaper has been coded. With more 
newspapers and articles the picture might have been different.  
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Graph 7: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Sweden, 2004-2012. 
(Author’s calculations) 
 
Sweden 
Regarding Sweden graph 7 shows that as Russia’s military expenditure increases, the 
perception of it as a threat in Swedish newspapers more or less does not change. There are 
several outliers. No literature really provides any guidelines to why Sweden should not be 
sensitive to Russia’s military expenditure. At least the non-changing threat picture is in line 
with the Swedish security policy for the studied period which described environmental 
changes, not Russia, as the main security threat to Sweden (Försvarsdepartementet 2007).  
In sum, In Finland and Sweden the perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat does 
not change as Russia increases its military expenditures. In Denmark the perception of threat 
actually decreases as Russia’s military expenditure increases. Norway is the only state that is 
sensitive to Russia’s increased military spending. Norway’s behavior indicates that even 
through the hypothesis regarding Russia’s military expenditure is rejected in this thesis it does 
not necessary mean that this variable does not have any effect in other circumstances.  The 
diverse correlation between Russia’s military expenditure variable and the different Nordic 
states threat perceptions explain why the variable measuring Russia’s military expenditure is 
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not statistically significant. That the Nordic countries would perceive Russia’s military 
capacity differently had some support in previous literature. 
To conclude, this thesis has contributed to research though conduction a systematic empirical 
analyses which shows that Russia’s military expenditure does not have impact on the average 
level of threat expressed about Russia’s military capacity in Nordic newspapers for the period 
2004-2012.  
Hypothesis 2: On average, the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the 
more threatful is the media picture of Russia’s military capacity.  
Both the first set of regressions (Table 2) and the following robustness check (Table 3) show 
that hypothesis 2 is supported by the data since both versions of the history variable (History 
and History_robustness) are statistically significant and in the predicted direction.  
The statistically significant influence of history confirms previous research in the strategic 
culture theory claiming that history influences international relations and the Nordic countries 
interests (see for example Neumann and Heikka 2005; Howlet and Glenn 2005). The result 
also supports the research mentioning how Finland’s (Luostarinen 1989) and Sweden’s (Kahn 
2009; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001) perception of Russia as a threat is based on historical 
experiences.  
Regarding Norway and Denmark the literature mentioned that both countries used to perceive 
the USSR as threatful but that none of them had a historical collective memory of Russia as a 
threat (Rowe and Hønneland 2010; Jensen 1999; Christiansson 2012). Since both Denmark 
and Norway had been coded low on the history variables thesis does not come to any other 
conclusions than those.  
Previous research did not agree upon if the history can influence news content. The result in 
this study lends support to Höjelid (1991) how claims that history can influence media 
pictures, while it does not confirm Wu (2000; 2003) findings that history has no influence on 
news content. This thesis has therefore to some extent contributed to bring clarity into this 
area of research even though further studies are needed. The thesis has also illustrated that it is 
possible to measure historical memories in a numerical way. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of Russia’s military expenditures on the media picture of Russia 
varies with history: the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the stronger 
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the impact of Russia’s military expenditures on the Nordic media picture of Russia as a 
threat. 
The hypothesis is not supported since the interaction term between Russia’s military 
expenditure and history is not statistically significant in predicting the extent to which 
Russia’s military capacity is pictured as a threat in the media in any of the models it is 
included in (Table 2, Model 5; Table 3, Model 5). As explained earlier in the discussion this is 
supposedly partly due to the differences between the countries in the variable capturing 
Russia’s military expenditure.  
That the effect of Russia’s military expenditure on the extent to which Russia’s military 
capacity is pictured as a threat depends on historical memories of Russia as an enemy has not 
been empirically tested in previous research. However such a claim was hinted throughout the 
literature which regarded Russia’s military capacity and historical perception of Russia as an 
enemy as closely related (for example Rodin 2010). It is further a reasonable interaction from 
a realist perspective arguing that history should not be forgotten when today’s threats are 
interpreted (Waltz 2000). These claims can very well be true during other circumstances than 
those addressed in this study.   
Hypothesis 4: On average, the higher the trade with Russia is, the less threatful is the media 
picture of Russia’s military capacity. 
  
Hypothesis 4 is partially supported. As the first set of regressions (Table 2) shows trade has a 
statically significant effect on the level of threat expressed about Russia’s military capacity in 
Nordic media and this effect is in the predicted direction. However, in the second set of 
regressions (Table 3) where a robustness check on the history variable was conducted the 
trade variable was not statistically significant in any model.  
 
On an overarching level this result strengthens the liberal assumption within international 
relations that high trade lowers incentives to conflict as argued by Polacheck and Seiglie 
(2006). Loustarinen (1989) claimed that high trade lead to that the enemy picture of the Soviet 
Union was dismantled in Finland, which is partly supported. The result shows that trade do 
decrease the perception of threat, but that Finland still have an enemy picture of Russia, at 
least in the media.   
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Concerning media content the result is in line with research by Wu (2000; 2003) and 
Pietiläinen (2006). However Wu and Pietläninen only claimed that trade influence the extent 
to which a certain country is mentioned in the media. A conclusion and contribution of this 
thesis is therefore that the level of trade tend to be able to influence how a certain media 
picture is portrayed.  
 
Hypothesis 5: On average, the lower the Russia’s level of democracy, the more threatful is the 
media picture of Russia’s military capacity.  
The hypothesis is not supported. As is shown in all models in the two regression tables (Table 
2 and 3) democracy was not statistically significant in predicting the extent to which Russia’s 
military capacity was pictured as a threat in the media. 
This is not in line with previous research. The liberal claim that democracy increases 
understanding and decreases hostilities (claimed by for example Rummel 1995) was not 
supported. 
The result does not confirm Risse-Kappen (1995) findings that an authoritarian development 
within a state will lead to that its armed forces is perceived as dangerous by democracies. The 
result is further a bit surprising since some literature clearly describes Russia’s authoritarian 
development as threatful (Lucas 2008; Johansson 2008; Konnander 2008). One of the reasons 
to why the democracy variable is not statistically significant can be the variation in the score 
which fluctuates rarely but drastically (can be observed in appendix H). It should also be 
remembered that this thesis is about Russia’s military capacity, had articles mentioning some 
other aspect of the Russian society been coded, such as the rights for NGO’s, the democracy 
variable might have had an observable effect. However the lack of significance for the 
democracy variable in combination with the significant effect of history can also be 
interpreted as that whatever level of democracy Russia has right now is dwarfed by the 
perception of its authoritarian history.  
In sum, the contribution of this thesis is that a systematic empiric analysis shows that 
democracy does not tend to influence the level of threat expressed in Nordic media 
concerning Russia’s military capacity.  
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7 Conclusion  
Previous research investigated which structural factors influenced how frequently certain 
news issues were mentioned in media. However there had been no research on how structural 
factors affect a certain media picture, such as the one of Russia’s military capacity. The aim 
of this thesis was to investigate the extent to which Russia’s military capacity was perceived 
as a threat in the Nordic countries, as portrayed by major Nordic media outlets between 2004 
and 2012, and to test what structural factors impacted this picture. To achieve these aims a 
time-serious cross-sectional dataset was gathered, which included a number of original data: 
namely a measure of media perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat and a couple 
of measures for a key independent variable ‘History’.  
Based on the quantitative analysis of the data, the conclusion this thesis has achieved is that 
Russia’s military capacity is indeed pictured as a threat in Nordic newspaper 2004-2012. This 
capacity was pictured as mostly a small but to some extent also as a clear threat. 
Further statistical analyses showed that the level of threat differs between the Nordic countries 
to a statistically significant extent. Denmark is the outlier with the lowest level of perceived 
threat. Sweden has the highest average of threat perception tightly followed by Finland. 
Norway ends up in between. This pattern was to some extent indicated by previous research.  
Using Prais-Winsten regressions structural determinants were tested against the extent to 
which Russia’s military capacity was expressed as a threat in the media. Based on these 
statistical analyses it is possible to conclude that Russia’s military expenditure and Russia’s 
level of democracy do not have any impact on the level of threat concerning Russia’s military 
capacity that is expressed in the media.  
However this thesis can conclude that two structural factors, history and trade, indeed can 
explain the extent to which Russia’s military capacity is pictured as a threat in Nordic media. 
Two different original indexes measuring collective memory of Russia as a threat were 
developed, one for the main analysis and other for a robustness test. Statistical tests showed 
that both of these history measures had statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable. This means that the stronger the historical memory of Russia as an enemy, the higher 
the perception of its military capacity as a threat.  
The level of trade was in one of the two sets of regressions confirmed to be able to predict the 
extent to which Russia’s military capacity was perceived as a threat. The conclusion from this 
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is that it is indicated that the higher the trade with Russia, as percentage of the Nordic 
country’s total trade, the lower the perception of Russia’s military capacity as a threat. 
In sum, the result from this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the Nordic 
countries perception of Russia. The result further contributes to research through showing that 
the extent to which Russia’s military capacity is pictured as a threat is due to historical 
memories and the level of trade. By coming to these results the thesis has shown that it is 
possible to measure historical memories numerically. In addition to this the thesis has shown 
that structural factors can influence how a certain media picture looks like.  
Future research can continue this path through testing the data collected for the purpose of this 
thesis in different contexts or contribute to develop more sophisticated numerical 
measurements. This thesis was just a first step to investigate if structural factors in 
international relations can explain how issues are pictured in the media. Future research can 
continue on this underresearched area through testing if other media pictures also can be 
explained by structural factors in international relations.  
If the result of this thesis can be said to have any policy implications it is that in international 
relations, as expressed by the media, the development of trade seems to be able to make a 
difference in dismantling a threat perception while historical collective memories linger.  
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Dagens Nyheter (SE) 2012/07/22 Risken med ett öppet förhållande 
Dagens Nyheter (SE) 2012/08/04 ”Det ser dystert ut för diplomatin 
Dagens Nyheter (SE) 2012/09/04 ”Rysk upprustning skärper hotet mot vårt närområde” 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2004/02/26 Satsa på internationella fredsinsatser Svenska freds: 
Sverige behöver inget invasionsförsvar 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2004/09/25 När offentlig retorik blir obehaglig 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2004/12/01 Estonia fraktade hemligt material 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2004/12/05 Ryssland rustar upp medan Sverige lägger ned 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2004/12/31 Och Europa fortsätter att stödja Putin 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2005/03/09 26-åring åtalad för spioneri 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2005/03/22 Krigsherren Sjamil Basajev- Rysslands fiende nummer 
ett 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2005/03/31 Lettlands president misstror Ryssland 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2005/05/21 Finländska politiker tonar ner ryska flygkränkningar 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2005/06/05 Ingen god granne i öster 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2006/10/08 Rysk journalist hittad mördad 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2006/10/12 Ryssland svår nöt för Sverige 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2006/11/15 Gasledning får svensk kritik 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2007/01/17 Ministern tar inte ställning 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2007/07/25 Vill vi kunna försvara oss? 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2007/08/29 Säg nej till gasledningen! 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2007/09/06 Avhoppet en mardröm för statsministern 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2007/11/27 Gasledning en allt hetare fråga 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2008/01/08 "Sverige stoppar inte gasledningen" 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2008/06/04 Vi måste kunna försvara Sverige 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2008/08/02 Ryskt jaktflyg irriterar Danmark 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2008/09/06 Ryssarnas utsikt: flaggskeppet i USA:s sjätte flotta 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2008/09/13 Rysslands militära kapacitet ingen överraskning för oss 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2009/01/20 Björklund vill ha starkare försvar 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2009/03/16 Kejsarens nya kläder 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2009/07/16 Danmark rustar för konflikter i Arktis 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2009/11/06 Regeringen alltför passiv i arbetet för nedrustning 
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Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2009/11/09 Förringa inte rysk styrke- demonstration 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2010/01/19 En bättre försvarsdebatt 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2010/02/08 Kapprustning i cyberrymden 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2010/05/21 Försvaret splittrar regeringen 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2010/09/17 Mona Sahlin (S) Så klarade sig partiledarna i studion 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2011/05/14 Norra ishavet het fråga 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2011/10/06 Maktspel sinkar sanktioner 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2011/12/09 Nato - Ryssland osams om robotsköld 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2012/06/03 Tre storheter styr ryssarnas liv 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2012/06/08 Rysk kritik väcker finsk irritation 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2012/08/03 Rysk vinter närmar sig 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2012/10/01 En modernare försvarsdebatt 
Göteborgs-Posten (SE) 2012/12/07 Grönt ljus för Jas i riksdagen 
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Appendices  
A. Makarov’s map 
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B. Overlapping claims in the Arctic 
Map available at < http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/04/11/cooperation-not-conflict-
in-the-arctic/> [Accessed 10 May 2013]  
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C. The Nordic declaration on solidarity, 5 April 2011  
“The Ministers emphasized a strong community of values between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden. Efforts to promote democracy, international law including human rights, 
gender equality and sustainable development are integral parts of the foreign policy of the Nordic 
countries. On the basis of common interest and geographical proximity it is natural for the Nordic 
countries to cooperate in meeting the challenges in the area of foreign and security policy in a 
spirit of solidarity. In this context Ministers discussed potential risks inter alia natural and man-
made disasters, cyber and terrorist attacks. Should a Nordic country be affected, the others will, 
upon request from that country, assist with relevant means. The intensified Nordic cooperation 
will be undertaken fully in line with each country’s security and defense policy and complement 
existing European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation.” 
(Available at Finland’s ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage: 
http://www.formin.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=217312) 
D. Statistics about the analyzed newspapers 
 
Table A1: Statistics about the analyzed newspapers 
 
 Daily circulation Daily readership Owner 
Sweden     
Dagens Nyheter  292 300  858 000  Bonnier 
Göteborgs-Posten  227 200  541 000  Stampen AB 
Norway     
Aftenposten  239 831  663 000 Scibsted ASA 
Bergens Tidende  82 432  232 000 Schibsted ASA 
Denmark     
Jyllands-Posten  106 717  400 000  JP/ Politikens Hus A/S 
Politiken  97 986  368 000  JP/ Politikens Hus A/S 
Finland     
Hufvudstadsbladet  50 000  100 000  Konstsamfundet 
Source: Nordic information Centre for Media and Communication research (Nordicom), 
Newspaper readership, daily reach of paper version, 2010.  
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E. Data on Russia’s military expenditure 
Table A2: Russia’s military 
expenditure 2004-2012 
Year In constant (2011) US$ 
millions.  
2004 44379 
2005 50505 
2006 56417 
2007 61824 
2008 67986 
2009 71566 
2010 72918 
2011 78330 
2012 90646 
Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database 2012. 
 
F. The Nordic countries historical interaction with Russia as of 2012 
Facts such as of year 2012 derived from the Swedish Nationalencyklopedin and CIA factbook.  
 Sweden: Independent 1523. 9 wars with Russia, 203 years since the last one. (The Finnish 
War 1808–1809; Gustav III's Russian war 1788-1790; The Hats’ Russian war 1741–1743; 
Great Northern war 1700-1721; Karl X Russian war 1656-1661; Ingrian War 1610-1617; 
The Nordic 25 years war 1570-1595; Livonian War 1558-1583; The great Russian War 
1554-1557) 
 Finland: Independent 1917. 2 wars with Russia, 68 years since the last one. (The 
Continuation war 1941-44; The Winter War 1939-1940) 
 Denmark: Independent 965. 1 war with Russia, 429 years since the last one (Livonian War 
1558-1583).  
 Norway: Independent 1905. No wars with Russia.  
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G. The Nordic countries trade with Russia 
 
Table A3: The Nordic countries 
trade with Russia 2004-2012 
Country/ year Trade with RU as 
% of total trade 
Denmark 2004 1,267 
Denmark 2005 1,424 
Denmark 2006 1,544 
Denmark 2007 1,457 
Denmark 2008 1,614 
Denmark 2009 1,105 
Denmark 2010 1,381 
Denmark 2011 1,854 
Denmark 2012 1,5 
Finland 2004 10,735 
Finland 2005 12,283 
Finland 2006 11,905 
Finland 2007 11,992 
Finland 2008 13,803 
Finland 2009 12,385 
Finland 2010 13,2 
Finland 2011 13,89 
Finland 2012 14,03 
Norway 2004 1,262 
Norway 2005 1,345 
Norway 2006 1,278 
Norway 2007 1,32 
Norway 2008 1,159 
Norway 2009 1,112 
Norway 2010 1,506 
Norway 2011 1,3 
Norway 2012 1,31 
Sweden 2004 1,8 
Sweden 2005 2,25 
Sweden 2006 2,51 
Sweden 2007 2,38 
Sweden 2008 3,197 
Sweden 2009 2,387 
Sweden 2010 3,22 
Sweden 2011 3,844 
Sweden 2012 3,596 
Source: Statistics from OECD and 
Statistics Sweden. 
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H. Russia’s democracy score 2004-2012 
Table A4: Russia’s 
democracy score 2004-2012 
2004 5,25 
2005 5,25 
2006 5,25 
2007 4,75 
2008 4,75 
2009 4,75 
2010 4,75 
2011 4,75 
2012 2,786 
Freedom House Imputed Polity Democracy 
score. Published in the Quality of 
Governance institute at the University of 
Gothenburg 2012 standard dataset. 
 
 
 
 
